to continue worthwhile living. In a theater of operations, combat
forces undoubtedly will still be in action after a nuclear explosion,
and the problem of their logistical support is even greater than
before but it is not insurmountable.
Results of nuclear testing show that, although railroads and
rail equipment are exceedingly vulnerable to the initial blast,
operations in and near the blast area may be resumed surprisingly
soon. Precautions must be taken to insure that transportation
railway service personnel are able to continue their duties after
nuclear explosions in a theater. The battalion commander specifies
an operation exposure guide for nuclear radiation. The information
needed by the unit monitor for operation through radioactive
contaminated areas is based on this guide, on individual unit history
of cumulative past exposure, and on information in Field Manual (FM)
312. The general methods and procedures given in the following
subparagraphs are usually sound for rail operations in areas where
radiation is present.
a. Delaying trains. The movement of trains through a
radioactivecontaminated area should be delayed as long as possible
without jeopardizing the railway mission. The longer the delay after
an area has become contaminated, the smaller the amount of radiation.
When necessary to move trains through contaminated areas, they should
proceed rapidly and avoid any stops, delays, or train meets whenever
possible. The method of operation normally best suited for these
requirements is the positive block method described in subparagraph
2.2b, but the fleet method explained in subparagraph 2.2a may be
used. The former method is the more efficient.
b. Protecting men. Maximum effort must be made to protect
passengers and operating personnel from radiation. Overexposure to
radioactivity must be avoided. Unless absolutely necessary, no
passengers should be moved through a contaminated area, but when it
is necessary, both they and the operating crews must be protected
from overexposure. The best and most reliable crews should be
chosen, and a team to monitor radiation dose rates should make the
trip. Decontamination teams should be trained in each of the railway
operating platoons so that the decontamination process for personnel
and equipment can take place as soon as possible after a run through
a contaminated area. If platoons lack the capability for this
process, additional assistance should be obtained through higher
headquarters. The train crews should be alternated constantly to
prevent overexposure to radioactivity from successive trips.
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